One-year quantum plan would back allies and block risky ties

Quantum researchers would get a clearer answer to a question that has hovered over the field: who can they work with, and under what rules? A federal amendment would recast U.S. quantum policy as both a partnership project and a security screen, with allies on one side of the line and foreign countries or entities of concern on the other.

Under the plan, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, or OSTP, would have to produce an International Quantum Cooperation Strategy within one year. The goal is to make cooperation with trusted partners a more deliberate part of federal quantum policy, especially where shared standards and technical compatibility matter.

A cooperation strategy with a locked door

The strategy would not be just a diplomacy memo. It would also have to include a plan to safeguard research and technology supported through international cooperation, including quantum technologies critical to national security, from malign influence, theft or exfiltration by foreign entities of concern.

The purposes language goes further, tying quantum cooperation to the quantum-relevant supply chain and, where appropriate, coordination on export controls or strategic trade controls. That puts the policy in a familiar modern posture: encourage collaboration where it strengthens the U.S. position, but treat sensitive technical ties as something to monitor closely.

Federal dollars would stop at the line

The funding restrictions are where the guardrails become real. Money made available under the amendment could not be used to promote, establish or finance quantum research activities between a U.S. entity and a foreign country of concern or foreign entity of concern.

That limit would apply in the NIST and NSF lanes, narrowing what federally supported quantum work can look like when international partners are involved. In practice, it means universities, labs and grant recipients would have to think harder about foreign collaboration before taking federal money into projects that touch this field.

Standards work gets a narrow exception

The amendment does leave one important opening. In the NIST section, the restriction would not apply to participation in consensus-based international standardization activities. That carve-out matters because standards work is one of the few places where cross-border cooperation can be useful without handing over the keys to a research program.

The result is a sharper split between ordinary standards-setting and research relationships that could pose higher security risks. For a field still trying to move from theory to deployment, that split could shape not just who the United States trusts, but how quickly it can build quantum partnerships without creating new vulnerabilities.